MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Edward M. O'Connor of PSB to obtain his views on the subject of Ukrainian Emigre Activities

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Edward M. O'Connor (PSB)

PLACE: Office of Mr. Edward M. O'Connor (PSB)

TIME: 3:00 - 4:15 PM, Monday, 26 January 1953

BECLASSIFIER AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES NETHODS EXEMPTION 3028 VAZIWAR CRIMES DISCLOBURE ACTUALE 2007

Mr. O'Connor made the following comments concerning the reactions of the Ukrainian emigre leaders to the Dobriansky mission in Germany.

l. Most of the Ukrainians were adamant about the proposed inclusion of the "Federalists" in the American Committee and considered such inclusion as a direct insult to the majority of the Ukrainians. According to the Ukrainian leaders with whom Mr. Dobriansky discussed this matter, the so-called Ukrainian "Federalists" have been created purposely as a Great Russian instrument of Messrs. Levine and Lyons; that it is common knowledge among the Ukrainians that, although Mr. Levine was primarily responsible for the establishment of the "Gulai Federalists", today he does not consider Gulai particularly representative of the Ukrainian emigre circles and is not in favor of including him in the Political Center. The prevailing opinion is that under no circumstances will the majority of the Ukrainians have anything to do with the individuals who call themselves Ukrainian "Federalists."

2. Mr. O'Connor reflected the following views as those being expressed by the prominent Ukrainians:

a. Unfortunately both Dobriansky and Dushnyck were unwittingly exploited by the Russian chauvinist interests within the Government;

b. Their mission was stabbed in the back by the Committee's release which was purposely timed so as to assure the failure of Dobriansky's mission;

c. The American Committee should be investigated by Congress for:



- (1) Acting in Stalin's interests;
- (2) Keeping out the "democratic elements";
- (3) Supporting extreme leftists, former Marxists, and Russian chauvinists;
- (4) Supporting with funds and otherwise the so-called "Federalist" group which does not even exist.
- d. While in Germany, Dobriansky had several conversations with Nicholaivski on the subject of the Ukrainian "Federalists." At that time Dobriansky asked Nicholaivski for more positive evidence concerning the existence of the Ukrainian "Federalists." Mr. Nicholaivski could not provide such evidence and could only make a vague statement that "40 percent of the Ukrainians are 'Federalists'." Mr. Dobriansky pointed out that this is not true and that he thought it would be an excellent idea if an impartial group of Americans was appointed to investigate the true strength of the so-called "Federalists." Mr. Nicholaivski declined such an offer.
- 3. A meeting is to be held 6 February 1953 of the National Board and the Executive Committee of the UCCA. The purpose of this meeting is:
 - a. To decide what course to follow on the national scene as a result of the Dobriansky mission;
 - b. To receive Dobriansky's report and recommendations;
 - c. To hear Halychyn's report on the accomplishments of the mission:
 - d. To hear dissenters from Scranton and other areas of the United States.
- Mr. O'Connor strongly recommends that some action must be taken by the American Committee before February 6 in order to forestall the resignation of Dobriansky from the UCCA. He feels strongly that we must now re-evaluate our entire effort directed toward the establishment of the Center and come up with a new formula which would be acceptable both to the Great Russians and the Nationalities. Unless this is done he feels that Dobriansky may be forced to resign, and if this happens he will most certainly be replaced by some Ukrainian leader who will not be a "friend" of the American Committee.





4. Mr. O'Connor feels that there are several courses of action open to us in view of the present intransigent attitude of both the Great Russian chauvinists and the minority separatists. One of these courses is the establishment of two completely different and unconnected centers. This obviously is not a workable solution nor should it be encouraged. The other solution, which he considers a practical one and the only one which would assure the successful establishment of a united center, is to establish two separate groups, one representing the Great Russian interests and the other the minority interests. These groups would be united at a top level by a coordinating committee which would represent the interests of both factions. Its sole purpose would be to assist the American Committee in the overthrow of the Soviet regime. In other words, Mr. O'Connor admits that we will never be able to reconcile completely and impartially the differences that separate the Great Russian chauvinists from the minority separatists; that both of these segments of the emigration will continue working towards their objectives regardless of what they may or may not do in the Political Center. The thing to do is to accept this fact and try to utilize it as best we can in the common struggle against the overthrow of the Soviet regime.

5. Mr. O'Connor had the following comments to make on the experience of the Dobriansky mission in:


a. England:

The British Foreign Office representatives, and particularly their emigre case officer, Mr. Gibson, made a strong effort to show Dobriansky that the British have a more realistic policy toward the Ukraine, and that the Ukrainians can expect more support for their national aspirations from the British than they can from the Americans.

b. Spain:

The Mission was well received in Spain and talked to the Ukrainian emigres now residing in that country. During Dobriansky's conversation with Sr. Martin Artajo, Spanish Foreign Minister, Sr. Artajo pointed out that just a short time before the arrival of the Dobriansky and Dushnyck mission in Spain, a Great Russian representative (Mr. Boldyreff) had a series of discussions with the Spanish foreign office officials. During these discussions Mr. Boldyreff attempted, in no uncertain terms, to dissuade the Spanish authorities from permitting the Ukrainians a free voice in the Spanish propaganda directed against the Soviet Union. When Mr. Dobriansky asked Sr. Artajo what the latter's reaction was to such a request, Sr. Artajo

SECURITY Information



said they obviously could not accept this and that they were going to support the Ukrainians in their propaganda effort. (This is extremely interesting inasmuch as Mr. Boldyreff in his talks with CSR/2 did not mention this subject at all.)

c. Germany:

The Mission was favorably received by both the German and U. S. officials. Mr. Dobriansky indicated that several conversations took place with the Foreign Minister, and an attempt was made by prominent members of the former German General Staff to get in contact with the Mission. However, on the advice of the American representatives, Dobriansky did not meet with the members of the former German General Staff. Mr. Dobriansky felt there was a strong interest on the part of the new Germany to learn as much as they could about the attitudes and aspirations of the Ukrainian emigres.

[[[4]]

SR/CPP

SR/CPP/MGN:cm Dictated 26 Jan 53.

Distribution:

- 1 CSR
- 1 CSR/1
- 1 CSR/3
- 1 Chrono
- 1 File